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120 time horizons and consequently different optimisation strategies. The concept of two selves 121 incorporates both self-control and time horizon issues: due to differences in time horizon 122 the ''planner'' uses self-control resources in order to suppress actions guided by the ''doer'' 123 with a short time horizon. Thaler and Shefrin also provide a rational explanation for the 124 use of self-imposed rules such as living within one's means and avoiding borrowing. They 125 state that decreasing consumption at any given period requires self-control effort which is 126 psychologically costly (although they assume that this effort is always possible and it is 127 only a matter of cost). In order to avoid paying this cost, people engage in pre-commit-128 ment that helps to save self-control energy. Automatic regular transfer of part of one's 129 income into a pension account is a good example of a cost-free pre-commitment that facil-130 itates saving, as this procedure means that a decision needs only to be made once and thus 131 is costless in terms of self-control. Other rules include avoiding spending assets and a ban 132 on spending future income. These rules are closely related to the authors' idea of different 133 propensities to spend from different mental accounts. In order to be useful, rules of thrift-134 iness should be simple, have only rare exceptions and be incorporated in habits. Shefrin 135 and Thaler provide numerous examples of their theory being supported by empirical facts 136 (for example, the existence of Christmas clubs and evidence that people enrolled in pension 137 plans at their workplace save more, as their saving is psychologically cost-free).
138
A new approach to saving and self-control was recently introduced by Baumeister and 139 Vohs (2003) , who explored the nature of the self-regulation function in relation to inter-140 temporal decisions. They describe self-control in terms of a power or energy resource 141 which is limited, can be used for multiple different tasks (ranging from physical activity 142 to highly responsible decision making) and is managed frugally by human beings. 143 In spite of the theoretical importance attached to the problem of saving intention real-144 isation, there is hardly any empirical research. Some empirical investigations of self-con-145 trol and saving were carried out by Daniel (1997) , but the results were inconclusive. 146 Recently, the self-control concept was studied in relation to impulse buying (Faber & 147 Vohs, 2004 ). This investigation is highly relevant to saving as it is acknowledged that in 148 their efforts to save people undertake actions to control their consumption (Wärneryd, 149 1999 ). Faber and Vohs understand self-control as a limited resource. They assume that 150 intensive usage of self-control for one task reduces our ability to exercise it equally success-151 fully in other tasks. Faber and Vohs experimentally depleted subjects' self-control 152 resources and then faced them with the tempting possibility of buying goods with dis-153 counts. They found out that those whose self-control was depleted tended to spend more 154 on impulse. 155
Due to the dataset considerations, in this study we do not deal with the global construct 156 of self-control, but with selected parameters that give us broader insight into relationship 157 of self-control and saving. Relevant dataset considerations and hypotheses are discussed in 158 the next section. 159 2. Dataset considerations and hypotheses
160
The Dutch dataset was not designed specifically for the purposes of this study. While 161 the DNB Household Survey offers the advantages of large representative samples and lon-162 gitudinal measurement, it provides a limited range of psychological variables to use. There 163 is no direct measure of self-control in the Dutch dataset. However, the dataset includes
205 Hypothesis 2. The plan-and-do group uses techniques that make saving automatic and 206 complicate spending savings more often than the plan-in-vain group. These techniques 207 include the automatic transfer of part of income into a saving account or (in Belarus) the 208 transfer of savings into a foreign currency. 209 2.3. Perceived easiness of expenditure control
210
Perceived easiness of expenditure control is related to the concept of perceived behav-211 ioural control in the Theory of Planned Behaviour (Ajzen, 1985) . We suggest that per-212 ceived behavioural control is not always adequate in the case of saving (which is 213 permitted by planned behaviour theory) and thus other factors of actual behavioural con-214 trol may interfere (e.g. techniques usage). The significance of perceived easiness of expen-215 diture control for saving was first demonstrated by Wärneryd (1998) and then replicated 216 by Webley, Burlando, and Viner (2000) . In both studies this variable was included in the 217 optimal models for predicting saving. This variable is currently widely accepted as a pre-218 dictor of saving behaviour (see also Nyhus, 2002) . We hypothesise that it is also related to 219 successful saving intention implementation, which has not been tested before. 220
The relationship between perceived easiness of expenditure control and self-control is 221 twofold. First, perceived easiness of expenditure control is related to the general amount 222 of self-control resource available and can be used as a proxy measure for self-control. On 223 the other hand, perceived easiness is related to self-efficacy and reflects the perceived dif-224 ficulty of a saving task and the perceived likelihood of achieving a saving goal. In this 225 respect, this measure reflects a perceived balance between a saving task's demand on 226 self-control resources and the actual availability of these resources. Thus, people who have 227 either strong self-control or perceive saving as an easy task in relation to self-control 228 resources available are more likely to have sufficient resources to realise their saving inten-229 tion. Hence, our third hypothesis.
230 Hypothesis 3. The plan-and-do group will perceive expenditure control as an easier task in 231 comparison to the plan-in-vain group.
232
For all three hypotheses we intend to generalise the findings to non-capitalistic eco-233 nomic setting. Thus, we test our hypotheses on two samples: capitalistic western economy 234 (Dutch sample) and non-capitalistic transition economy (Belarus). 
236
The results from two datasets are presented here: a secondary analysis of the DNB 237 Household Survey that uses a large panel of Dutch respondents and a face-to-face ques-238 tionnaire survey conducted in Belarus. 
240
Dutch. Data were collected from a representative sample of the Dutch population with 241 computer-assisted methods. The sampling procedure used telephone directories as the 242 sampling frame. Respondents whose numbers were selected were contacted by phone 243 and invited to take part in the research in return for the use of a PC and modem. About
244 18% of households that were originally contacted agreed to participate. As some groups 245 (such as single persons and older households) were less likely to agree, quotas for certain 246 social parameters were introduced. Details of sample forming and data collection proce-247 dures can be found in Nyhus (1996) . 248
The DNB Household Survey is conducted annually. Due to the drop-out rate, which is 249 quite significant (see Table 1 ), the panel is regularly refreshed with new participants. 250
Using 1998-2004 data waves we identified four groups of respondents, whose 251 agreement between saving plans and saving behaviour stayed the same for at least two 252 subsequent years. This was done in order to select respondents with stable behavioural 253 patterns. 254
Respondents in the first group planned to save and saved for two years subsequently. Table 1 ) and the panel of respondents is replaced almost completely in four years. 272 Bearing in mind that although the drop-out rate is high, it may be the case that newcomers 273 drop-out more frequently than ''core'' participants who stay in the panel for years, and 274 thus an overlap between datasets may emerge, we carefully checked for cases appearing 275 in more than one dataset (this was possible as each case has a unique number). No cases 276 appeared in two datasets. The group sizes and their weight in the general sample are given 277 in Table 2.  278 The 2002-2004 sample consisted of 821 respondents, of whom 54.7% were male 279 and 45.1% were female. Ages ranged from 23 to 91 (mean 51). Fifty-four percent were 
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280 employees, 2.7% -self-employed, 0.9% -students and 18.9% -retired. The 2000-2002 281 sample consisted of 484 respondents, of whom 57.2% were male and 42.8% female. Ages 282 ranged from 23 to 85 (mean 51). Fifty-four percent were employees, 1.2% -self-employed, 283 1.2% -students and 20.9% -retired. The 1998-2000 sample consisted of 283 participants, 284 of whom 62.5% were male and 37.1% were female. Ages ranged from 29 to 81 (mean 56). 285 Forty percent were employed and 15.6% -retired (other information on occupation cat-286 egories is not available).
287
Although the size of groups varies significantly over the years (due to the fact that the 288 drop-out rate has somewhat decreased in recent years and general sample size increased), 289 the percentage of respondents falling in each of the planning/saving group is very consis-290 tent. The plan-and-do group is the biggest -more than 80% of respondents plan to save 291 and are able to realise their plans in two subsequent years. Other groups are significantly 292 smaller. The plan-in-vain group comprises about 5-6% of the population and people who 293 do not intend to save represent about 8%. Thus there is a small but consistent group of 294 respondents who are not able to carry out their saving intentions. 295
Belarusian. The second data set was collected through a face-to-face questionnaire sur-296 vey in Minsk, the capital city of Belarus, in May 2005. The sample is representative for the 297 city population by gender, age group and city district. Inside the specified cells respondents 298 were chosen pseudo-randomly. There were 283 respondents (54% female), aged between 299 20 and 79 (average age 39.6). The monthly reported individual income ranged from 800 300 to 3,000,000 Belarusian roubles, with average income of 448,000 roubles (about 225 US 301 dollars), which corresponds well to the average income level in the city. Forty-two percent 302 of respondents saved during the last year. 303
Respondents were allocated to the same four groups -plan-and-do, plan-in-vain, sav-304 ing rejection and unexpected saving -as the Dutch sample. The only difference was that 305 saving plans in the Belarusian sample were measured retrospectively: respondents were 306 asked to recollect whether they planned to save a year ago, whilst in the Dutch sample 307 answers from the previous year's questionnaire were used. 
309
Dutch. Members of the panel completed five long questionnaires each year. In this 310 paper only the data from the ''Economic and Psychological Concepts'' questionnaire 311 are used. Full details of the questionnaires can be obtained from the DNB Household Sur-312 vey website (http://www.uvt.nl/centerdata/dhs/). The items included in the analysis are 313 described in the ''variables measurement'' section below. 
Belarusian. The questionnaire consisted of nine parts and 50 questions. It included 315 questions on saving socialisation, money management and temptation coping strategies, 316 saving behaviour and motives, usage of bank services, attitudes to money and socio-eco-317 nomic and demographic indicators. . This was based on the assump-335 tion that parameters measured during the planning year would have more impact on 336 implementation behaviour; the parameters measured when the plan is already imple-337 mented or failed are of less significance for prediction of success or failure. In the Belaru-338 sian sample saving behaviour and independent variables were measured at one point of 339 time. 340
Expenditure control techniques. In the Dutch questionnaire nine expenditure control 341 techniques were listed. They included keeping a house-keeping book, not having credit 342 cards or cheques, securing tax return, having a limited amount of money on oneself, with-343 drawing only a certain amount from the bank at the beginning of each month, transferring 344 a certain amount to a saving account automatically each month, returning things bought 345 on impulse back to shops, avoiding shopping and doing something else to control expen-346 ditures. For each technique respondents had to answer whether they used it or not. In the Belarusian questionnaire respondents were asked whether they used the follow-354 ing expenditure control techniques: not keeping much money on oneself, avoiding going 355 shopping, planning budget in advance, keeping money for different purposes separately, 356 keeping a house-keeping book, persuading oneself that one does not need things that 357 are tempting, putting part of income separately and trying to forget about it, transferring 358 part of income into a separate bank account, transferring part of income into a foreign
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359 currency, transferring foreign currency back to national currency by small amounts. Some 360 of the techniques were the same as for the Dutch sample, while others were specific for 361 Belarus. 362
For the purposes of the analysis some of the techniques were combined into a ''minor 363 shopping-related techniques'' scale. This included three highly correlated techniques in the 364 Dutch sample (avoiding shopping, having limited money on oneself and returning things 365 to shops) and two of these techniques in the Belarusian sample (avoiding shopping and 366 having little money on oneself; returning things back was not measured in the Belarusian 367 survey). If a respondent used at least one of these techniques, she scored 1 on the scale, if 368 she did not use any of them, she scored 0. 369
Perceived easiness of expenditure control. This was measured with one question which 370 was the same in both questionnaires: ''How difficult is it for you to control your expendi-371 tures?'' with answers on a 7-point scale ranging from ''very easy'' to ''very difficult''. Saving plans and saving. In the Dutch questionnaire respondents were asked ''Are you 375 planning to put money aside in the next 12 months?'' They had four ordinal answer 376 options from ''yes, certainly'' to ''certainly not''. For the purpose of analysis the first 377 two options (''yes, certainly'' and ''yes, perhaps'') were combined together, and the same 378 was done with the two last options (''probably not'' and ''certainly not''). There was also a 379 ''don't know'' option. The answers to this question were compared with the answers of the 380 same respondents to the question ''Did you put any money aside in the last 12 months?'' in 381 the following year's questionnaire. 382
In the Belarusian questionnaire saving plans were measured retrospectively. Respon-383 dents were asked the following question: ''A year ago, did you plan to save during this 384 year?'' They had to answer ''yes'' or ''no''. Later in the questionnaire they were asked 385 whether they had saved during the last 12 months, with possible answers being ''yes'' or 386 ''no''. Thus, in both questionnaires saving was measured by self-report measures.
4. Results

388
Outliers on income were removed in both datasets before the analysis.
389 4.1. Differences in time horizon 390 Table 3 contains the results of pairwise comparisons between the plan-and-do and plan-391 in-vain groups in Belarus and in three two-year periods in the Netherlands. 392
In all four datasets differences in time horizon between the plan-and-do and plan-in-393 vain groups are statistically significant (see Table 3 ), with successful savers planning their 394 finances further ahead. At the same time estimates of effect size vary from year to year. 395 The effect size is very pronounced in the 1998-2000 period in the Dutch data, is moderate 396 in Belarusian sample, but is fairly small in the latest two periods of the Dutch data. How-397 ever, the data consistently show that people who successfully implement their saving plans 398 have longer time horizons in comparison with those who fail to realise their plans. Thus, 399 Hypothesis 1 is supported by the data. 400
As it may be argued that the result obtained is due to a positive relationship between 401 time horizon and income, we also present data for those respondents whose income lies
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402 between 40th and 60th percentiles, representing 20% of the sample with income level clos-403 est to average. The results are still statistically significant for the Netherlands. Although 404 for the Belarusian sample the results are significant at the level of p = 0.1, the means of 405 time horizon length for two groups are the same as in the analysis for the whole sample 406 and the effect size of the difference is even bigger.
1 This shows that lower estimate of sta-407 tistical significance of the difference is rather due to decreased number of observations in 408 this case. Thus, we conclude that the relationship between time horizon and saving plan 409 implementation exists independently of income level. 410 Table 4 provides evidence that the relationship between the length of time horizon and 411 successful saving is linear -the longer ahead people plan, the more likely it is that they will 412 implement their saving plans. For example, in the Belarusian sample 26.8% of respondents 413 who plan their finances for a month or less implement saving plans successfully, but the 414 percentage of successful savers increases up to 72.7% among those who plan for couple 415 of years ahead. 416 We have also controlled for age in this analysis. Entering age as a covariate in the GLM 417 analysis with time horizon as a dependent variable and type of saver as a predictor, we 418 found that after controlling for age the difference in time horizon between successful 419 and unsuccessful savers is still significant (F = 2.5, p = 0.09). 
. Differences in usage of expenditure control techniques
421
The data in Table 5 show that successful Dutch savers are often involved in contractual 422 saving, transferring part of their income automatically into a different bank account. This 423 should make saving psychologically easier, as it makes day-to-day efforts to save unneces-424 sary. On the other hand, respondents who are not able to realise their saving intentions use 425 minor shopping-related techniques: they try to avoid shopping, keep little money on them-426 selves or return bought goods. Techniques used more by the ''plan-in-vain'' group are 427 often less ''technical'', simpler and require effort each day to carry them out. 428
The data for Belarus are different. The differences in the use of separate bank accounts 429 between the two groups are insignificant and the percentage of respondents who use sep-430 arate accounts for saving is much lower. The reason is that opening a bank account in 431 Belarus is a rather complicated procedure. It requires a certain amount of income which 432 means that not everyone who wants to use this technique for expenditure control is able to 433 do so. Consequently, people use other techniques that are more available -for example, 434 they transfer their savings into foreign currency. We believe that this behaviour fulfils 435 the same functions as transferring money into a separate account in the Netherlands: it 436 keeps it separate and makes spending it more complicated. In addition, a transfer into for-437 eign currency is a precaution against inflation. The data in Table 5 show that Belarusian 438 respondents who transfer their savings into foreign currency are more likely to implement 439 their saving plans successfully. 440 We also controlled for the influence of income level in these findings. The users of sep-441 arate accounts are better-off in comparison with non-users in Belarus, which is expected 442 and determined by banks' policy. But users and non-users of the technique of transferring 443 into a foreign currency do not differ in income level. The differences in income between the 444 Dutch users and non-users of separate accounts are also statistically insignificant. Thus, 445 the relationship between the use of expenditure control techniques and the realisation of 446 saving plans exists independently of income. Hypothesis 2 is thus supported by the data. 
448
The data on differences in perceived easiness of expenditure control are not conclusive 449 (see Table 6 ). The differences between the plan-in-vain and plan-and-do groups are statis-450 tically insignificant in the Belarusian sample and in 1998-2000 period of the Dutch data. 
485 the central attributes of this goal, such as the final purpose of saving. People with a short 486 time horizon will be prone to concentrate on more peripheral aspects such as the restric-487 tion of immediate consumption needs and this lessens their chance of realising saving 488 plans. 489 It is also possible that a shorter time horizon makes people underestimate future expen-490 ditures. These people are less likely to take into account long-term factors such as the 491 growth of children's needs or inflation rates, they generally think about the future in less 492 detail and this makes their plans less elaborate and flexible, which is the reason for their 493 more frequent failure. This hypothesis needs further investigation. 494 The importance of expenditure control techniques that emerged in this study stresses 495 the issue of self-control in relation to saving and reinforces the view that similar psycho-496 logical processes underlie saving and other behaviours requiring self-control (such as diet-497 ing). The techniques that covary with successful implementation of saving plans have one 498 thing in common: they make the saving process partially automatic and require less reli-499 ance on will-power (unlike other strategies that are more often used by plan-in-vain group, 500 such as avoiding shopping, having little money on oneself and returning things to shops). 501 The successful expenditure control techniques may result from ''implementation inten-502 tions'': sets of simple rules that link a desired behaviour to clear situational clues (such 503 as ''as soon as I get my salary, I will transfer 20% of it to a separate account''). These find-504 ings are in line with previous research showing that forming an implementation intention 505 increases the chances of successful plan realisation (Gollwitzer & Brandstätter, 1997) . 506 The results on the use of expenditure control techniques are also in line with research on 507 problematic debt by Webley and Nyhus (2001) who found that more ''high-tech'' and 508 long-term techniques such as automatic bank transfer are more often used by people with-509 out debts, while debtors more often avoid shopping and return things to shops. 510
The mental accounting perspective is another framework that is relevant to the results 511 on the usage of expenditure control techniques. Keeping money in a separate account or in 512 a separate currency not only complicates spending it physically, but also fosters a different 513 psychological perception of this money. As soon as money is transformed to a different 514 form or account, it is incorporated into the ''assets'' mental account which is less likely 515 to be spent. 516
The notions of self-control, mental accounting and time horizon are all linked to saving 517 in the behavioural life-cycle theory (Thaler & Shefrin, 1992) . The assumptions of this theory 518 are largely supported by the data. The fact that successful and unsuccessful savers differ in 519 the length of time horizon is in line with the two selves model. In terms of the behavioural 520 life-cycle hypothesis, having a long time horizon means being under the control of the 521 ''planner'' who ensures that saving plans are carried out. Differences in the usage of expen-522 diture control techniques relate to the behavioural life-cycle hypothesis in two ways. First, 523 the automatic transfer to a separate account is a typical example of a self-imposed rule that 524 reduces the psychological cost of restricting consumption by avoiding frequent decision 525 making. Second, useful techniques activate the usage of other rules -such as a ban on 526 spending assets -through transferring saved income into a different mental account. Thus, 527 the data provide some support for two concepts of the behavioural life-cycle hypothesis -528 the two selves model and the mental accounting framework. 529
The results for perceived easiness of expenditure control may be inconclusive for two 530 reasons. We suggested that people who perceive expenditure control as an easier task either 531 need less energy to cope with it or have more self-control resources initially and thus have 532 higher chances of exercising expenditure control successfully. But although expenditure 533 control may be perceived as an equally easy task by two people, they may have different 534 other demands for their self-control resource and thus have different amount of self-control 535 to deal with an expenditure control task. Although we measured the construct that reflects 536 perceived easiness of the task and initial amount of will-power available to achieve it, we 537 did not control for other demands for will power in the respondents' environment. The 538 other possible reason is the imperfection of measurement -easiness of expenditure control 539 was measured with only one item and did not account for individual differences in general 540 self-control. 541
This study does have some limitations. First, the intensity of intention to save was not 542 controlled for, although it might have a significant impact on intention-behaviour consis-543 tency (see for example Gollwitzer, 2006) .
2 Second, the degree of intention implementation 544 was not measured. The participants were not asked how much they planned to save, so it 545 was not possible to measure whether they completely realised their plan (i.e. planned to 546 save €100 and saved €100) or less (for example, saved €50 whilst they planned to save 547 €100). Thus, the respondents were classified as successful savers if they reported any sav-548 ings, even if this was a smaller sum than the one they intended to save. These limitations 549 were imposed by the Dutch data. It would be desirable to control for intensity of intention 550 and degree of plans realisation in future research. 551
Another limitation of the study is related to the small cell sizes in the analysis of expen-552 diture control techniques usage. Both the number of unsuccessful savers and the number 553 of users of some techniques were rather small in the earlier waves of the Dutch data. How-554 ever, wherever this problem occurs, the results in question are supported (by statistically 555 significant results or by the tendency) by the results from other waves, which do not suffer 556 from the small cell size problem. 557
It is also necessary to note that the focus of this paper is on individual saving. However, 558 the saving decisions of individuals who are members of households are influenced by other 559 household members. This problem is beyond the scope of this paper, but represents a 560 promising direction for future research (see for example Meier, Kirchler, & Hubert, 1999) . 561
Finally, the reliability of the findings is slightly compromised by the differences in mea-562 surement of saving intention in the two samples. The retrospective measure of saving plans 563 (used in the Belarusian sample) may be biased, as the result of the saving attempt is 564 already known by the time of reporting. However, in spite of this problem, the results 565 of the analysis are very consistent with the Dutch sample findings, where a longitudinal 566 approach was used. This consistency, in spite of differences in measurement, lends even 567 more support to the conclusions. 568 The results of this study have implications for further research. First, the relationship 569 between self-control and saving should be explored in more detail. Especially beneficial 570 would be any attempts to establish causal links. For example, currently available data 571 do not allow us to state that there is a causal link between the usage of certain expenditure
